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Abstract—Wearables are small and have limited user in-
terfaces, so they often wirelessly interface with a personal
smartphone/computer to relay information from the wearable
for display or other interactions. In this paper, we envision a
new method, LightTouch, by which a wearable can establish a
secure connection to an ambient display, such as a television
or a computer monitor, while ensuring the user’s intention to
connect to the display. LightTouch uses standard RF meth-
ods (like Bluetooth) for communicating the data to display,
securely bootstrapped via the visible-light communication (the
brightness channel) from the display to the low-cost, low-power,
ambient light sensor of a wearable. A screen ‘touch’ gesture
is adopted by users to ensure that the modulation of screen
brightness can be securely captured by the ambient light sensor
with minimized noise. Wireless coordination with the processor
driving the display establishes a shared secret based on the
brightness channel information. We further propose novel on-
screen localization and correlation algorithms to improve security
and reliability. Through experiments and a preliminary user
study we demonstrate that LightTouch is compatible with current
display and wearable designs, is easy to use (about 6 seconds to
connect), is reliable (up to 98% success connection ratio), and is
secure against attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wearable computers such as Google Wear smartwatches,
the Nike FuelBand, and the FitBit Flex bracelet are gaining
in popularity for health and fitness tracking and as com-
panions to some smartphone applications. They are small,
power-constrained, wrist or body-worn devices that integrate
low-power sensors, microcontrollers and wireless interfaces
to monitor physical activity and physiological body signals,
notify their wearer of inbound messages, command remote
computers with gestures, and more. Most such wearables are
limited in their user interface. They are often paired with a
personal smartphone, and used for limited functions.
We seek methods to extend wearable usage to ambient
display applications. We envision a quick and effective way
that captures the user’s intent to initiate connection between a
wearable device and an ambient display, with minimum diffi-
culty, with minimum modifications to the display, and without
assuming the wearable device has been previously introduced
to the display. Our connection methods are applicable to a
wide range of mobile devices, but for this paper we describe
them using a bracelet as the wearable and a computer display
or a smart TV as the device to connect with.
Our goal is to enable a user to use her wearable to enhance
the ambient display applications. The ‘ambient’ display is not
carried by the user, but rather is some convenient display such
as a hotel television, a restaurant tablet, a treadmill monitor,
or even an in-car dashboard display [1]. Using these ambient
displays, the user can access and display information from
her bracelet. For example, in a gym, a runner connects her
mHealth bracelet to a treadmill monitor so that she is able
to see her respiration rate and heart rate; in a restaurant, a
customer checks her blood glucose level at a tablet before
ordering food; or in a hospital, a patient connects her bracelet
with a doctor’s display, so they can view recent activity and
health data on the display in the exam room.
Using an ambient display to access the bracelet’s informa-
tion extends the user’s interaction with their bracelet, but it
raises security concerns. Consider a scenario in which there
are multiple bracelets and multiple displays present; if a user
tries to wirelessly connect her bracelet to a new display, the
connection may be redirected and the communication may be
eavesdropped or modified by attackers. If a wrong display
is connected, the private information at the bracelet may be
revealed; if a wrong bracelet is connected, the user will view
incorrect information at the display. Without a pre-shared
secret, we require a usable method to enable the user to
securely introduce her bracelet to a newly encountered ambient
display. Of course, even if the devices are securely connected,
the information shown on the screen could be eavesdropped
by shoulder-surfing attackers. Recent studies offer methods to
address such security attacks [2], [3]. In this paper, we focus
on a different but more fundamental step, i.e., bootstrapping
a secure RF connection.
We propose a new method to use visible light communi-
cation as a means to establish a secure RF communication
channel, e.g., Bluetooth or Wi-Fi, between a bracelet and the
intended display while achieving compatibility and usability.
To be compatible with existing bracelets and displays, our
approach uses a low-power light sensor as a light receiver at
the bracelet and a desktop monitor screen as a light source
at the display. A one-way brightness-modulated visible light
channel (called ‘brightness channel’ in this paper) is then
created between the screen and the light sensor. We explore a
touch gesture instead of a pointing gesture, i.e., the user does
not need to see the screen, but simply holds the bracelet to
touch any location of the screen. (A touch-sensitive screen is
not necessary.) We are particularly interested in how to achieve
the secrecy and accuracy of the brightness channel and how
to use these properties to improve the security of connection.
Our contributions are three-fold.




















Fig. 1. System model of LightTouch
First, we introduce LightTouch, a new method of connecting
bracelets to ambient displays, according to a user’s intention,
while achieving compatibility and usability. LightTouch does
not require additional or specialized hardware in the display.
Second, our solution exploits a one-way brightness channel
between the light sensor of the bracelet and the screen of the
display, achieving the desired security goals. We address the
secrecy problem (for which we developed a novel on-screen
localization algorithm) and the error-tolerance problem (for
which we developed a correlation algorithm to reduce the
duration of the brightness channel communication).
Third, we implemented and evaluated LightTouch in a
small, cheap, and low-power bracelet prototype and tested it
using off-the-shelf displays in various ambient light conditions.
The experimental results demonstrate that LightTouch achieves
the desired security. With suggested parameters, LightTouch
achieved 98% successful connection ratio, and the attacker
could only succeed with probability 0.46% even when close
to the target display. A preliminary user study showed 42 of 50
(84%) connections performed by real users were successful.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We describe the system model and the security model.
A. System model
Figure 1 provides a high-level view of the LightTouch
system. The system includes a target bracelet that belongs
to a user, and an ambient display that is available for the
user to use but may belong to another owner. The bracelet
has a built-in ambient light sensor to detect ambient light
information. The display has a screen the user can physically
touch, though a touch-sensitive screen is not required. We
assume the bracelet and the display have a common RF
interface, such as Bluetooth, for data communication.
Consider a scenario where multiple devices are in a proxi-
mal space and they all have received a connection request from
a user’s bracelet. The bracelet/display needs to quickly find
and create a secure communication with the display/bracelet.
As indicated elsewhere, two devices cannot efficiently estab-
lish a secure communication via the RF channel alone if they
have no pre-shared secret [4], [5]. LightTouch utilizes light
from the display as an out-of-band channel to bootstrap the
secure RF communication.
Secrecy of the brightness channel. We note that the size
of the screen is often much bigger than the bracelet and
the wrist: if the whole screen is used as light source, the
eavesdropping attackers can access the information from the
unprotected portion of the screen; however, if a fixed small
portion of the screen is used as the light source, the user
needs to ensure the sensor is pointed at the source, increasing
the operation difficulty. LightTouch uses a novel on-screen
localization algorithm to tackle this problem. The localization
algorithm helps the display to derive the bracelet’s location
and create a location-adaptive light source. The touch gesture
ensures the light source occurs underneath the bracelet and
thus is only accessible to the bracelet, but not accessible
to attackers. Thus, the secrecy of the brightness channel is
achieved. The user-dependent source location also increases
the difficulty of eavesdropping attacks because the user could
use her bracelet, human wrist and human body to occlude the
attacker’s eavesdropping angles. As far as we know, ours is
the first use of adaptive localization to enhance the secrecy of
a brightness channel.
Balancing time with accuracy. The time duration of a
touch gesture should be minimized as much as possible; it
is impractical and error-prone if users are required to hold
the bracelet still on the screen for a long time. Indeed, we
found the accuracy of brightness channel is much worse than
expected due to many factors, such as the screen type, the light
sensor, the brightness and contrast settings of the screen, the
ambient light condition, and wrist motion. Most LCD monitors
support only a low refresh frequency 60-75 Hz. Some light
sensors have a response delay to sudden changes in brightness.
If the brightness channel lasts only for a few seconds, the
sensor readings may not be accurate enough to be useful. Like
other out-of-band solutions [6], efficient use of the brightness
channel is a challenging goal.
B. Security model
Consider the scenario in which the user operates the connec-
tion in an insecure environment. Nearby devices manipulated
by attackers may attempt to compromise the user’s intention by
impersonation, eavesdropping, and modification attacks. Other
types of attacks, e.g., compromising the bracelet or the display,
physically stealing the bracelet, and denial-of-service attacks,
are beyond our scope. We assume the attackers have devices
more powerful than the bracelet and the display in terms of
sensing, communication, and computation capability, but may
not physically touch the display.
Impersonation attacks aim to impersonate one device to
establish a secure connection with the other device. In our
scenario, if an attacker impersonates the display and success-
fully connects to the bracelet [A1], the bracelet’s information
will be sent to the attacker; if an attacker impersonates the
bracelet and connects to the display [A2], the user will view
incorrect information at the display. In either case, the user’s
intention is compromised.
LightTouch has three security goals. [S1] The bracelet’s
information is only transmitted to the display intended by
the bracelet’s wearer. [S2] The information displayed at the
display is only that sent from the bracelet, and only when
that bracelet’s wearer has intended the information to display.
[S3] The information from the target bracelet to the target
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display cannot be eavesdropped or undetectably modified
during the transmission.
III. LIGHTTOUCH
We first give an overview, and then describe the algorithms.
A. Overview
The bracelet and the display may find multiple devices in
their RF communication ranges. The display’s ID information
can be embedded in the brightness pattern such that the
wearable can identify the device with the ID information and
connect to it via the RF channel. Considering an attacker
can manipulate the devices with the same ID information,
LightTouch is designed to help the display and the wearable
verify whether the connected device is the intended device. If
yes, they establish a session key according to the following
four steps (shown in Table I).
Step 1. The user holds her bracelet up to any location on
the screen, so that the light sensor is touching the screen.
The display runs a localization algorithm to quickly derive the
on-screen location L of the bracelet. Specifically, the display
sends a full-screen pattern F . If the bracelet is held at any on-
screen location of the display, it receives a brightness sample
S. The bracelet returns S to the display via the RF channel,
and the display derives the location L based on F and S.
Step 2. The display sends a hash value H of its Diffie-
Hellman (DH) public parameter ga = ga (a is the DH secret
key of the display) and a freshly chosen challenge C to the
bracelet. It runs an encoding algorithm to convert (H,C) into
a brightness pattern. The display shows the pattern in a circular
screen area centered at L with a radius r. If the bracelet is
held at an actual on-screen location L′ and ||L − L′|| ≤ r,
it receives a sequence of brightness values corresponding to
the pattern. After a decoding algorithm (separating the values
and eliminating the redundant values), the bracelet obtains
a sequence of encoded brightness values (Hb, Cb); these
values should be correlated to (H,C) due to our encoding
and decoding algorithms, but may not be identical due to
environmental noise.
Step 3. The display sends its DH public parameter ga
to the bracelet via the RF channel. If the bracelet connects
to the target display, it receives the correct ga and obtains
H = h(ga). The bracelet then runs a correlation algorithm to
calculate the correlation score between H and Hb. Assuming
the authenticity of the brightness channel, the bracelet believes
Hb is from the target device and only accepts H if the corre-
lation algorithm outputs 1. The intuition of using correlation
is to tolerate some noise. If the bracelet accepts H , it proceeds
to the next step; otherwise, it stops the protocol.
Step 4. The bracelet encrypts Cb with session key sk =
gab and sends the ciphertext E and its DH public parameter
gb = g
b to the display (b is the DH secret key of the bracelet).
Only the display knowing secret a can calculate the session
key sk = h(gab ) and obtain Cb = Dec(sk, E). If the display
finds that Cb is correlated to C, it confirms the connection;

























Fig. 2. Full-screen patterns
only be received by the target bracelet (assuming the secrecy
of the brightness channel), and therefore, receiving a correlated
Cb means the display is connected to the target bracelet.
After finishing the four steps in the bootstrapping protocol,
the display confirms the connection. It then encrypts a message
‘success’ with session key sk, and sends the ciphertext D to
the bracelet. The bracelet uses the session key sk to decrypt
D. If it is ‘success’, the bracelet notifies the wearer of the
successful connection.
B. Localization algorithm
As mentioned above, we allow the user to place her bracelet
at any location on the screen, for convenience. Ours is the first
work that uses such a localization algorithm to enhance the
secrecy of a brightness channel.
We design a pattern F shown on the full screen. The
bracelet, placed at any on-screen location, is able to capture
a sample of F . F is a sequence of four distinctive full-
screen images {Fmin, Fmax, Fx, Fy}: Fmin is filled with a
dark gray scale (ηmin, ηmin, ηmin) (RGB value), Fmax is
filled with a lighter gray scale (ηmax, ηmax, ηmax), Fx is filled
with fine-grained gray scales (η, η, η) where pixel brightness
η increases monotonically from ηmin to ηmax along the X-
axis as shown in Figure 2(a); and Fy is filled with the same
gray scales, which increase monotonically along the Y -axis
as shown in Figure 2(b). The bracelet is supposed to receive
four readings S = (smin, smax, sx, sy) corresponding to four
images respectively, and send S back to the display via the
RF channel. The display receives S, calculates the derived
location L = (x, y) based on F and S, and then shows the
secret pattern in a circular screen area centered at L with a
radius r. The display sets r to an appropriate value, not too
small (so the bracelet can receive the secret pattern) and not
too large (to ensure the bracelet and the wrist can cover and
protect the light source). We discuss the grayscale ranges and
the calculation of L and r in Section IV.
C. Encoding algorithm
The display runs an encoding algorithm to convert a se-
cret number into a pattern. A secret pattern is a sequence
of grayscale values. The number of used grayscale values
is a constant k, which is known to both the display and
the bracelet. The grayscale values (from the most dark to
the most bright) are denoted by b1, · · · , bk where b1 =
(ηmin, ηmin, ηmin) and bk = (ηmax, ηmax, ηmax). The differ-
ence between any two adjacent grayscale values is ηmax−ηmink−1 .
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TABLE I
NOTATION AND LIGHTTOUCH BOOTSTRAPPING PROTOCOL
F full-screen pattern 99KF full-screen light source Enc,Dec symmetric key
L bracelet’s location 99KL light source at L encryption and decryption
S brightness samples →,← RF channel sk session key
Cr correlation algorithm Lb, tb bracelet’s correlation parameters h secure hash function
C secret challenge Ld, td display’s correlation parameters g, a, b Diffie-Hellman parameters
Display (ga = ga) Bracelet (gb = gb)
1© Localization Send a full-screen pattern F 99KF Receive S at one location L
Receive S, and derive location L ←− Send S
2© En- & De-coding Send H = h(ga) and C 99KL Receive Hb, Cb
Send ga −→ Receive ga
3© Correlation If Cr(h(ga), Hb, Lb, tb) = 1, ga is verified.
Calculate sk = h(gba)
4© Correlation Receive E and gb, and calculate sk = h(gab ) ←− Send E = Enc(sk, Cb) and gb
If Cr(C,Dec(sk, E), Ld, td) = 1,
gb and connection are verified.








Full-screen pattern Secret pattern
1 2 3 4
Pre-amble Inter-amble Post-amble
Separation marks
Fig. 3. Encoding and decoding for the Brightness Channel
To encode H , the display converts H into a β-length k-ary
number h1 · · ·hβ where hj ∈ [0, k−1] for 1 ≤ j ≤ β. For each
hj , the display then finds the grayscale value bhj and maps
H to a brightness pattern (bh1+1, · · · , bhβ+1). To encode C,
the display uses the same method.
D. Decoding algorithm
The display and the bracelet adopt a special decoding
algorithm. The display adds recognizable signals to the pattern
such that the bracelet can decode the pattern from the sensor
readings by using these signals. As shown in Figure 3, the pre-
amble, inter-amble, and post-amble are signals added to help
the bracelet to detect when and what patterns are transmitted.
The pre-amble is used to indicate that the full-screen pattern
is about to be sent, and the post-amble is used to indicate
that the whole transmission is ended. The inter-amble is used
to indicate that localization is finished and the secret pattern
is about to send. The pre/post-amble are set as black, while
the inter-amble is set as white. All three are displayed for a
relatively long time Ta to be recognizable.
The display shows the secret pattern at frequency 1/Tb, i.e.,
each grayscale value is shown for duration Tb. LightTouch
requires the receiving frequency at the light sensor to be
higher than 1/Tb such that each grayscale value has at least
one sensor reading. However, a higher receiving frequency
may cause repeated sensor readings for one grayscale value.
LightTouch uses separation marks to solve the problem. Each
separation mark is added between any two grayscale values
in the full-screen pattern and the secret pattern as shown in
Figure 2. The separation mark is set as black with time period
Tf shorter than Ta so it is distinguishable from the minimum
grayscale value ηmin and the pre/inter/post-amble.
Adding separation marks enables the bracelet to separate the
sensor readings for adjacent grayscale values. Since most light
sensors are basically resistors, they do not respond instantly to
the changes in screen brightness. The display may also have a
performance delay of showing the patterns. Finally, the display
and the bracelet must synchronize time using the separation
marks. The bracelet considers the series of sensor readings,
one window W at a time. We set the window width to match
the signal period, Tb+Tf . If the number of readings during Tf
is Nf , and the number of readings during Tb is Nb, the window
has N = Nf +Nb readings. The bracelet finds the maximum
reading within the N -reading window; if the middle value
of the peak-detection window is the peak value, W is shifted
forward by bN/2c, i.e., the bN/2c oldest values in the window
are replaced with bN/2c newest ones; if not, W is shifted by
1, i.e., the oldest value in the window is replaced with the
new one. In this way, the grayscale value is extracted (the peak
value in the window) and the window quickly becomes aligned
with the signal. The length N is set so that bN/2c ≤ Nf to
capture the peak value if it appears at the end of Tb, and
bN/2c ≥ Nb to avoid capture of two repeated peak values for
one grayscale value. As such, we have Nb ≤ bN/2c ≤ Nf .
If the sensor uses a constant frequency, we have Tf ≥ Tb.
To improve efficiency, we choose the minimum Tf = Tb, i.e.,
Nb = N/2 = Nf .
We used a similar approach (separation marks and peak de-
tection) for transmitting and receiving the full-screen pattern.
Since the localization accuracy determines the effectiveness
and the security of LightTouch, we prefer to choose T ′b
and T ′f for showing the full-screen pattern larger than Tb
and Tf . We choose T ′b = T
′
f and Tb = Tf . The time
duration we use the brightness channel in LightTouch is thus
T = 3Ta + 8T
′
b + 2(2β − 1)Tb.
E. Correlation algorithm
We prefer to use an error-tolerant correlation algorithm
rather than a bit-extraction algorithm because: i) the sensor
readings are not accurate enough for bit-extraction; and ii) the
bracelet and the display can leverage their RF channel.
The bracelet receives a sequence of brightness values from
the display, and obtains Hb and Cb after the decoding process
above. It also obtains ga from the display via the RF channel




Bracelet: Arduino UNO board Display: 24” HP monitor
Light sensor: 3 Photocells h: SHA-256 hash function
BLE: nRF8001 H,C, sk: 256-bit number
and calculates H = h(ga). The correlation algorithm with
inputs (H,Hb, Lb, tb) outputs 1 if i) the correlation score is
< Lb and ii) the difference of their lengths is < tb, and
outputs 0 otherwise. (Lb, tb) are adjustable parameters. If we
choose a larger Lb or tb, the bracelet tolerates more differences
between Hb and H (high usability), and the chance for the
impersonation attacks to succeed is greater (low security).
The correlation function begins by normalizing Hb and H ,
resulting in H̄b and H̄ . Because H and Hb might not be of
equal length, we use a dynamic time warping algorithm [7]
to calculate the correlation score of H̄b and H̄ . In this
algorithm, the two sequences are “warped” non-linearly in
the time dimension to determine a measure of their similarity
independent of certain non-linear variations in time.
After the bracelet sends Cb to the display, the display uses a
similar correlation algorithm with parameter (Ld, td) to verify
that C and Cb are correlated. The balance between usability
and security is the focus of the correlation algorithm, which
we analyze in Section IV.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Security, compatibility, and usability are our three goals for
LightTouch. Before evaluating the algorithms, we first check
the compatibility and usability of LightTouch from a high-
level view. For compatibility, we implemented the LightTouch
bracelet using a popular Arduino board equipped with an
ambient light sensor (photocell) and a Bluetooth Low Energy
(BLE) module; we implemented the LightTouch display as
a Python program compatible with MacOS, Windows, and
Linux operating systems. The RF channel between the bracelet
and the display is implemented using BLE, which is widely
supported by existing bracelets, smartphones, tablets, laptops,
and computers due to its low power consumption. (We expect
it will soon be implemented in many smart TV and similar am-
bient display devices.) We attempted to evaluate our solutions
by using commercially-available wrist devices but we found
that programmable wrist devices restrict the highest sensing
frequency of the ambient light sensor to 1Hz; it appears this
limit is imposed by the wearable operating system rather than
the hardware itself. Instead, we built a bracelet prototype
with cheap photocells where the sensing frequency is more
easily adjusted. To evaluate usability, we tested LightTouch
with three photocells, one at a time. LightTouch achieved
an average 98% successful connection ratio while resisting
impersonation attacks against the display and the bracelet, an
encouraging result. The parameters are shown in Table II.
We first evaluated the accuracy of the localization algorithm
and the impersonation attacks that use the leaked patterns. We
then studied the efficiency of the encoding and decoding algo-

















Fig. 4. Bracelet and Display Setup
algorithm and the impersonation attacks that guess the DH
public parameters.
Accuracy of localization: The localization algorithm helps
the display to calculate a derived bracelet’s location L′, which
could be different from the bracelet’s actual location L. In
practice, the display is not able to obtain L or δ = ||L−L′||.
As such, the display has to choose a radius r large enough
to ensure the photocell can access the light source regardless
of δ. We use the following settings for evaluating localization:
we evaluate the full-screen pattern by using two different sized
windows (1920,1080) and (800, 800) on an HP monitor. The
actual size of (1920,1080) is 51.8 cm× 29.1 cm and that
of (800,800) is 21.5 cm × 21.5 cm. Note that the “full-
screen” pattern does not necessarily take up the whole screen.
We set the display to max brightness and max contrast to
maximize the difference between any two grayscale values.
We set T ′b = 100 ms and Ta = 150 ms. We chose 25 locations
uniformly distributed over the defined screen for placing the
photocells as shown in Figure 4(b). For each location, the
display uses a linear interpolation of (smin, smax, sx, sy) to
derive the location:







We recorded the 25 measured locations L′ = (x′, y′), and cal-
culated each distance δ = ||L−L′|| = ((x−x′)2+(y−y′)2)1/2.
The maximum distances δ corresponding to the 25 locations
are shown by the flat horizontal lines in Figure 5 where each
value is the maximum of 100 localization runs. In the linear
interpolation case we found that the distance δ was the largest
when the photocell was near to the central point of the full-
screen pattern. In addition, though the photocells have a small
sensing surface, they may receive multiple grayscale values.
This could be another cause of localization errors. From our
experimental results as shown in Figure 5, if the display relies
on the one-time linear interpolation to derive L′, r needs to be
about 4-5 cm for (1920, 1080), and 2-3 cm for (800, 800). If
we put the photocell at the center of a circular paper board, to
cover the light source, the paper board needs to have a radius
2r, i.e., 8-10 cm for (1920, 1080) and 4-6 cm for (800, 800)
as shown in Figure 6. Accordingly, the required width, i.e.,
the diameter of the paper board, is 16-20 cm or 8-12 cm.
From the National Library of Medicine [8], the average
human wrist circumference of women at height (5’2”-5’5”)
and men at height (> 5’5”) are 15.24 cm and 16.51 cm, respec-
tively, and the corresponding wrist widths are approximately
INFOCOM 2017 Authors' preprint - thaw.org Copyright @2017 by IEEE
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(d) P2, (800, 800)
Fig. 5. Evaluation of four localization methods
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Fig. 6. Required width and actual width
4.8 cm and 5.2 cm. We also examined existing smart watches,
most of which have a 4 cm × 4 cm screen. The required
widths 16-20 cm or 8-12 cm are much larger than the actual
width of a bracelet and human wrist. As such, this one-time
linear localization was not good enough. We further improved
the localization accuracy by using the following methods.
1) Multi-time method: If the display shows the full-screen
pattern multiple times, the photocell will capture multiple
samples. The display could obtain the average values of the
samples and derive a more precise location. As shown in
Figure 5, if other parameters are the same, the multiple-
time method generally outperformed the one-time localization
algorithm and reduces r by 0.23-0.61 cm. A disadvantage of
this method is that it increases the duration of the brightness
channel communication, i.e., the time required for users to
hold their bracelets up to the screen.
2) Two-stage method: The idea for this method is to
adaptively change the size of the screen pattern in two stages.
In the first stage, the display shows the full-screen pattern at
full size, e.g., (1920, 1080). Suppose the display obtains a
derived location L′ and based on the linear method it knows
the maximum localization error is r1. In the second stage,
the display shows a smaller full-screen pattern centered at L′
with a size (2r1, 2r1). This guarantees the smaller pattern can
be seen by the photocell. After receiving the second sample
corresponding to the smaller pattern, the display derives a
more precise location of the bracelet. From Figure 5, the two-
stage method significantly improves the localization accuracy
compared to the one-time and the multi-time linear methods.
With the two-stage method, r can be chosen around 1 cm
or even smaller than 1 cm in some cases. The two-stage
method doubles the time needed for localization and keeps
the features of the linear interpolation which can be easily
implemented. One disadvantage of this method is it requires
learning the statistics of r1 and chooses r1 conservatively to
ensure successful readings of the photocell in the second stage.
3) Non-linear method: Readings from photocells do not
have a strictly-linear relation with grayscale value η for many
reasons. Displays commonly apply a Gamma correction to
colors to compensate for properties of human vision because
human eyes have greater sensitivity to relative differences
between darker tones than between lighter tones [9]. The
goal of Gamma correction is to maximize the use of the
bandwidth relative to how humans perceive light and color.
In our experiments the light captured by the photocell from
the screen has been altered by the Gamma correction Γ. So
we tried learning such changes for different grayscale values
and using that to reverse the effects of Gamma correction.
We ran tests of localization at 25 locations, 100 runs at each,
and based on the measured distance we learned a reverse
Gamma correction function Γ̄. We added Γ̄ as the last step of
calculating the locations of the bracelet. As shown in Figure 5,
the performance of the non-linear method was comparable
with the two-stage method for (800, 800), while it was faster,
requiring only transmission of one full-screen pattern. For
pattern size (1920, 1080) the non-linear method outperformed
the one-time and multi-time methods, but it was not as good
as the two-stage method.
Impersonation attacks using the leaked patterns. Attacks
A1 and A2 may benefit from information leaked when the
display transmits a secret pattern. We experimented with
the two-stage and non-linear localization methods. We chose
photocell P2, and screen size (800,800). We made three round-
shaped and non-transparent paper boards, with radius rb =
1 cm and 1.25 cm (shown in Figure 4). We fixed photocell
P2 at the center of the boards, and used transparent sticky
tape to fix the boards on the screen. To simulate the different
locations of the photocell, we generated the full-screen pattern
at random locations on the screen, while ensuring the photocell
was located inside the full-screen pattern. After the localization
algorithm completes, it showed the secret pattern centered at
the derived location L′ with a radius r for 3 seconds, and then
launched the next round of localization. For the experimental
results shown in Figure 5(f), we chose r = 0.69 cm if
the display used the non-linear method and r = 0.45 cm
if the display used the two-stage method. We repeated the
localization test for 500 rounds for each setting, and used a
camera to record the whole screen of the monitor. Here, one
camera was enough; as shown in Figure 4(b), the camera can
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cover the whole screen. In addition, the ambient light sensor
with a board tightly touches the screen so that no side angles
can be used to access the brightness pattern underneath the
board. Thus, the camera could identify localization failures
if the pattern was shown at other on-screen locations. The
recording time for a test of each setting was about 6-8 minutes.
We later scanned the video: if we visibly saw a secret pattern
extending beyond a board, we added 1 to a localization failure
count. For the two-stage method, we found the board with
rb = 1 cm was big enough to cover the light source with
r = 0.45 cm. We did not see the secret patterns in any case.
On the other hand, for the non-linear method, we found 230
localization failures out of 500 runs when rb = 1 cm and
41 failures out of 500 runs when rb = 1.25 cm. The two-
stage method provides much better accuracy on localization,
and thus a better secrecy of the brightness channel than the
non-linear method. As such, LightTouch prefers to use the
two-stage method for localization.
Efficiency of encoding and decoding: The efficiency
and accuracy of the pattern transmission over the brightness
channel depends on two parameters: i) the time duration Tb
for showing a grayscale value in the brightness pattern and
ii) the length β of the pattern (as a k-ary number). We chose
Tb = 20 or 25 ms for a test with high efficiency (readings
are not stable) and chose Tb = 50 or 100 ms for a test
with high accuracy. The grayscale value range was set as
[60, 240]. By setting the increment of η as 5 or 2, we obtained
k = 37 or k = 91 grayscale values, respectively. We used
a SHA-256 hash function h to generate H = h(ga). The
256 bits of H are converted to a k-ary number to be sent
over the brightness channel. Based on the above parameter
settings, if Tb = 20 ms twenty-five 37-ary numbers can be
transmitted via the brightness channel in one second. The size
of the number space in one second is about 3725 ≈ 2130.
In other words, 130 bits can be transmitted per second, and
the time needed to transmit a 256-bit number is 1.96 s. We
realize that existing approaches could achieve much higher
data-transmission rates, e.g., a barcode approach can achieve
throughput of 91-172 kbps [10], and the LED approach uses
a high frequency (1000 Hz) signal to transmit megabits per
second [11]. However, they are not compatible with our
scenario where the display screen only supports 60-75 Hz
refresh rates, and a camera-based solution was not suitable
for a bracelet due to its size and power limitations.
Effectiveness of correlation: In LightTouch, the correlation
algorithm has two steps: comparing the length α of Hb with
the length β of H (as a k-ary number), and correlating Hb
with H . Thus, our evaluation has two steps as well:
1) In Figures 7(a) and 7(b), we plot the probability distribu-
tion of the length α of Hb. All of the probability distributions
in this experiment are obtained from at least 250 samples. We
can see that the relatively slow change of the screen brightness
enabled the photocells to capture Hb of a similar length to
H . When Tb = 50 or 100 ms, the range of the number of
peaks was [47, 53] for β = 50 and [38, 45] for β = 40. In
comparison, when Tb = 20 or 25 ms, the ranges extended
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Fig. 7. Evaluation of correlation
to [46, 65] for β = 50 and [34, 49] for β = 40. From the
distribution, we see that the photocell obtained Hb with a
length similar to H . The bracelet can set tb = 8 for β = 40
and tb = 10 for β = 50 to accept more than 99% of samples.
2) In Figures 7(c) and 7(d), we plot the cumulative distribu-
tion of the correlation score between Hb and H . We used 1-
norm distance in the dynamic time-warping algorithm. Gener-
ally, if Tb decreased, the probability of having a large correla-
tion score increased: if the transmission of one grayscale value
was short, such as 20 ms or 25 ms, the screen and photocells
both generated more errors. In Figures 7(c) and 7(d), when
β = 50, we chose Lb to be (3.9, 4.6, 6.0, 6.1) and when
β = 40, we chose Lb to be (2.1, 3.5, 5.7, 6.3), respectively
for Tb ∈ {100, 50, 25, 20} ms. With these Lb and tb values,
LightTouch achieved 98% successful connection ratio.
Impersonation attacks guessing eligible DH public pa-
rameters: Consider an attacker A1 that uses a device to
impersonate the display’s RF communications and connect to
the target bracelet. The attacker also has a device connecting
via RF to the display but not touching the display, and the
attacker uses this device to generate fake samples to ensure that
the bracelet is able to receive Hb and Cb from the display via
the brightness channel (otherwise, the attack can be detected
by the bracelet). The attacker is able to know ga (sent by
the display over the RF channel), H = h(ga), the length
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β of H (as a k-ary number), tb and Lb, but it does not
know Hb because the secrecy of the brightness channel is
achieved. Then, the attacker forges a DH public parameter g′a
and sends g′a to the bracelet via the RF channel in Step 3.
Denote the length β′ of H ′ = h(g′a) (as a k-ary number). To
succeed, the attacker needs to ensure β′ ∈ [β − tb, β + tb]
and the correlation score of H ′ and Hb is smaller than Lb.
The attacker can generate as many DH public parameters as
it wants. However, the attacker cannot choose a specific hash
value H ′ and reversely obtain the parameter g′a. Thus, H
′ is
a random number from the attacker’s perspective. A1 can test
g′a in many ways and selectively send g
′
a to the bracelet. To
get g′a pass the verification, A1 can adopt four good strategies
(other strategies have less success probability):
• AD1 sends g′a to the bracelet if β′ ∈ [β − tb, β + tb];
• AD2 sends g′a to the bracelet if β′ = β − tb;
• AD3 sends g′a to the bracelet if β′ = β + tb;
• AD4 sends g′a to the bracelet if β′ ∈ [β − tb, β + tb] and
the correlation score of (H ′, H) is < a threshold (set as 6).
In our experiment, the attacker first randomly chooses 106
DH public parameters and obtains 106 corresponding hash
values H ′. The attacker then converts the hash values into
k-ary numbers, and only chooses the numbers with lengths in
[β − tb, β + tb] because the attacker knows other hash values
would not be accepted by the bracelet. We chose Tb = 20 ms,
calculated the correlation scores of these hash values with Hb,
and plot the cumulative distribution in Figure 7(e) and 7(f). For
k = 37 (Figure 7(e)), we see that the most effective strategy
was AD4 (who carefully used the reference H and its length
β). Especially when the correlation score of H and Hb is
small, e.g., 3.33 and 5.17, AD4’s hash value H ′ is much more
likely to be correlated with Hb because H ′ is correlated with
H and H is correlated with Hb. On the other hand, for k = 91
(Figure 7(f)), we found the most effective strategy was AD2,
i.e., choosing length-32 hash values. When k = 91, β′ was
the major factor in the correlation score while using the value
of H is not helpful.
Now, let us look closer at the successful connection ratio
and successful attack probability together. When Tb = 20 ms,
the bracelet has to set Lb = 6.3 to achieve 98% successful
connection ratio for k = 37 and k = 91, while AD4
(5.17) succeeds with a probability 0.46% for k = 37 and
AD2 succeeds with a probability 8.7% for k = 91. Note
that the attacker cannot increase its success probability by
simply repeating the protocols because the devices reset the
parameters every time after the correlation fails. The hash
value Hb used for correlation is different for each run. One
reason that the correlation when Tb = 20 ms and k = 91 could
not distinguish a forged H ′ from the authentic H effectively
is we chose too many grayscale values, i.e., k = 91. In fact,
the grayscale values ranged from 60 to 240, which means
the grayscale value increased by 2 per level. Therefore, the
noise from the screen and the photocells are overwhelming
factors to the readings. We conclude that, to achieve both
usability and security, LightTouch should use k = 37 to define
the grayscale values. In this case, LightTouch achieved 98%
successful connection ratio and the attacker can only succeed
with probability 0.46% (using strategy AD4).
Time efficiency: The time needed to send a full-screen
pattern is 800 ms (100 ms × 4 × 2) if the non-linear method
is used, and 1600 ms if the two-stage method is used. The
shortest time for the brightness channel to send a secret pattern
is 1980 × 2 ms (one for H and one for C) when k = 37,
β = 50 and Tb = 20 ms. We set pre/inter/post-ambles to
150 ms. In summary, the time for the brightness channel
is 150 × 3 + 800 + 1980 × 2 = 5210 ms (with non-linear
localization) or 150× 3 + 1600 + 1980× 2 = 6010 ms (with
two-stage localization). The process takes about six seconds,
which we believe is quite acceptable as the first prototype.
Preliminary user study: We conducted a preliminary user
study of LightTouch. Five users each repeated the Light-
Touch connection process ten times. We used the parameters
suggested in the previous section; the connection succeeded
42 times out of 50 attempts. In contrast to our benchtop
successful connection ratio 98%, the users succeeded only
84% of the time. The motion of the user’s wrist could cause
the light sensor to move to a different location and lose parts of
transmitted patterns. We added an accelerometer to the bracelet
prototype. We found that the acceleration data collected during
7 of the failed connections indicate an observable movement
of the user’s wrist. We envision multiple ways to increase the
successful connection ratio and thereby improve the usability
of LightTouch: i) increase the size of the light source to
allow for slight wrist movement, ii) change the correlation
parameters, and iii) reduce the time needed for the protocol.
These options all trade off security and usability, and require a
more extensive user study to fully evaluate human factors and
LightTouch usability in real-world settings (varying displays,
devices, sensors, environment, users, and attacks).
V. RELATED WORK
Proximity is often considered as a means for expressing
intent of connecting two devices at a short distance. In
proximity, the audio signals [12], [13], [14] and radio signals
[15], [16] received at two devices exhibit a similar pattern,
which can be used as a secret. NFC and RFID are short-range
radio communication technologies, and they can also be used
to send a secret from one device to another. In proximity-
based approaches, attackers are assumed to be physically away
from the target devices. However, this assumption might not
be true in a mobile environment. Some security-enhanced
techniques have been proposed: some researchers developed an
attenuation technique enabling users to adaptively change the
NFC communication range [17], and others explored a specific
user gesture as an additional user intent [18]. As proximity
alone does not represent user intent, these solutions require
user effort to compensate.
Passkey-based approaches require the user’s visual, gesture,
or memory effort to input the same key in both devices or to
pass the key from one device to the other [19], [20], [21]. The
user’s intent is confirmed if the same passkey is input to two
devices by users. If both devices have keypads or one has a
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keypad and the other has a screen, this approach is easy to
implement; Apple’s AirPlay is one example of this approach,
which can connect a MacOS computer with an Apple TV.
However, for interface-constrained devices, such as bracelets, a
screen and keypad may not be available. GesturePIN proposed
ten gestures including 3D stroke-based directional movements
as the passwords [20]. Users could wear the bracelet and
perform the gestures according to the instruction shown on
the screen, and the acceleration data will be decoded as the
passkey. However, such approach requires user effort, is error-
prone, and is subject to visual eavesdropping attacks.
Correlating sensor data is another approach for expressing
user intent. ShakeWellBeforeUse requires a user to shake two
devices at the same time such that the acceleration data sensed
separately at the devices can be correlated and the acceleration
data can be used as secret or used for mutual authentica-
tion [22]. ZEBRA continuously monitors the behavior of user’s
computer interaction, and correlates the user’s wrist movement
captured by the bracelet with the inputs from keyboard and
mouse of the used computer [23]. In general this method helps
two devices with sensing capability obtain user intent from the
same user’s behavior. In our scenario, we seek solutions for
standard displays with no specialized hardware for sensing.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we introduce LightTouch, a novel distributed
communication approach that enables users to securely con-
nect their bracelets with ambient displays. Our approach
respects a user’s intentionality in a compatible, usable, and
secure solution, in which a screen and ambient light sensor
are used to create an out-of-band channel for bootstrapping
secure communication. We developed a novel on-screen local-
ization method with a touch gesture and a location-adaptive
light source, so our method successfully resists impersonation
attacks on the establishment of a secure connection. We used a
pattern correlation approach (with a tunable balance between
accuracy and efficiency) to resist display impersonation at-
tacks. LightTouch is compatible with existing wearables due
to its use of low-cost, low-power sensors, and is usable with
minimum user effort, i.e., a touch gesture; LightTouch is
secure because it ensures the communication link corresponds
to user intent. We implement LightTouch in a small, cheap,
and low-power bracelet prototype and test it using off-the-shelf
displays. Through our experiments conducted in a lab setting,
we show that LightTouch interaction can complete around 6
seconds, while connecting successfully in 98% of test cases
and achieving a low attack probability of 0.46%.
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